I
At first glance there were few American statesmen better placed to cope with the secession crisis than James Buchanan. By the time it erupted the President had not only been in the White House for more than three years; for almost forty years he had been at or close to the centre of politics. He had served in each house of Congress for over a decade, had been Minister to Russia and to the Court of St James and had been Secretary of State. His election to the presidency in 1856 owed much to a widespread, and surely plausible, assumption that his would be above all a safe pair of hands. 1 In fact his personal opinions and his previous political experience ill prepared Buchanan for the crisis that was to engulf the nation after the election of Abraham Lincoln. It was not, however, so much that Buchanan alone, or even that members of his party alone, could not cope. Rather the crisis posed problems that went far beyond the capacity of statesmen on all sides, whether they were Democrats or Republicans, secessionists or Unionists, to manage. As the nation moved closer towards, and finally into, war it became apparent that no one was in control of events. A war that neither northerners nor southerners wanted or intended arrived and brought with it carnage and bloodshed on an unprecedented scale.
Are we dealing then, as some historians have argued, with a failure of statesmanship on the part of a "blundering generation" of Americans, a generation whose personal shortcomings propelled the nation into war?
2 This is a tempting conclusion but it is one that should be resisted. Buchanan and those who presided over the final, hectic months of the antebellum Republic were often acting as their most deeply held principles required. Even when their actions were inconsistent or their attitudes ambivalent, those attitudes and actions often registered the tensions or the contradictions within their world views. And those world views or ideologies were themselves deeply rooted in the lived experience and the material conditions of millions of Americans. The war and the descent into it were only superficially the product of individual errors or shortcomings. The real causes were far more deeply rooted.
3 II James Buchanan was, of course, a Democrat and he was convinced that the principles of the Democratic party could and would steer the nation through its present adversities. This had been one of his governing assumptions for many decades but it was one that would not serve him well in the final months prior to the conflagration of 1861.
It is difficult for the modern observer to appreciate the depth of party loyalty in the antebellum Republic. 4 And it was above all the Democratic party that commanded this loyalty. The typical Democrat believed that the nation's extraordinary economic and territorial growth together with the glorious history that its democratic institutions exhibited were attributable to the policies and practices that its governments, both state and Federal but especially Federal, had pursued. And most of the time, as Democrats never tired of reminding both themselves and the electorate, the Federal government had been in the hands of the Democratic party (including its Jeffersonian Republican antecedent).
In truth the Democratic party was more akin to a church than to a modern-day political party. Democratic partisans -and there were few more partisan Democrats than James Buchanan -were wont to review the past and to conclude not merely that previous triumphs were attributable to Democratic policies but that the underlying principles of the Democratic creed, if adhered to, would ensure the wellbeing of the nation indefinitely. As Buchanan put it in the mid-1840s, when the slavery question was beginning to threaten national unity, the "best security" of Democrats was "in the hour of danger … to cling fast to their time-honoured principles."
5
What were these principles? For Democrats like Buchanan the key was to maintain the traditional rights of the states and to ensure that the Federal government remained, in most spheres at any rate, inactive. "The best government," Democrats had been proclaiming for many decades, "is that which governs least." This meant, as far as the sectional controversy was concerned, leaving the states free to go their own way. They should be free to choose slavery or to reject it, unencumbered by opinion elsewhere. In the mid-1850s the Kansas-Nebraska Act had extended this principle by insisting that the Federal government renounce the powers that it had previously exercised in relation to slavery in the territories. The Act clothed the territories of debt. By the time of the election Breckinridge and Buchanan, unlike Douglas and his supporters, were both committed to the policy of a Federal slave code (which would guarantee slaveholders' rights in any territory). Such a policy, which denied to both Congress and its inhabitants the right of a territory to exclude slavery, was anathema to most northerners. 8 Buchanan here showed his persistent blindness to the slavery controversy.
Although he did not claim that secession would be justified in the event of a Republican victory, he neither repudiated the claim when Breckinridge supporters made it nor dissociated himself from those who used it to intimidate voters into supporting them. In other words during the campaign Buchanan inclined strongly to a southern (though not an overtly secessionist) stance.
9
Unfortunately the orthodox, traditional Democratic policies to which the President clung had little to offer by the time the sectional controversy had reached these heights. Both wings of the party in 1860 agreed that Congress should not rule either for or against slavery in a given territory. Advocates of a slave code claimed that their policy would simply give slaveholders the right to go into a territory with their slaves and be protected there, just as holders of other property were protected.
Their opponents retorted, however, that, given the nature of slavery and the refusal of slaveholders to allow open discussion of its merits, such a policy would allow the slaveholding minority in a territory to impose draconian restrictions on the freedom of (antislavery) opinion and (antislavery) expression similar to those that had disfigured Kansas. Thus each side demanded equality; each approach necessarily violated it.
Once again Buchanan -together with his fellow Democrats -was blind to these considerations.
Instead, after the election results were known, the President continued to favour a slave code, the very policy that a huge majority of northerners and a majority of voters in the nation as a whole had just rejected. Nothing could more vividly illustrate the bankruptcy of the "time-honoured" principles of the Democratic party.
But once again this mistake was not merely an individual aberration; it flowed from the ideology of the Democratic party. And it was no coincidence that that party, with its traditional base in the South, where slavery was so deeply entrenched, embraced a set of principles which steadily undercut the antislavery movement. Democratic principles offered great support, sometimes overt, often covert, to slavery.
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III
Election day was November 6. As soon as it became apparent that Lincoln had won, talk of secession became more widespread than ever before. The Constitution meant that Lincoln would surely be installed in the White House but it also meant that he would not occupy it until March 4, almost four months away. Buchanan would, of course, remain in charge for this period.
11
One of the reasons the President and other Democrats had traditionally favoured the South was their determination to maintain the Union, the principal threat to which, they believed, lay in the antislavery movement. But when southerners now talked of secession the result was a fracturing of Democratic ideology. In effect, for northerners like Buchanan, their dedication to the Union clashed with their opposition to the antislavery movement and their sympathy with the South. However deep that sympathy, most of them could not countenance the breakup of their nation. But
Democratic principles did not leave them well placed to resolve these contradictions.
The result was that, rather than maintain a single, coherent policy, the President, over the coming weeks and months, would often hesitate or vacillate; the fracturing of Democratic ideology was responsible.
As soon as it was known that Lincoln had been elected, and secession was threatened, politicians were compelled to react. Most Republicans dismissed these threats as idle; they were convinced that southerners were merely bluffing, seeking, as ever, to intimidate weak northerners. This reminds us that it was not only the President and the Democratic party that were unable fully to grasp the events of the secession crisis. It also reminds us that, like the Democrats, Republicans perceived events through an ideological prism. Believing that the northern social order was natural and the southern, because of slavery, grossly unnatural, Republicans typically assumed that the slaveholders needed the Union to shore up an otherwise rickety social system. These perceptions were, in their turn, grounded in northerners'
concrete experiences of their social order which was held to be inherently harmonious and benign. As a result, however little they might appreciate northern antislavery Holt, denied the legality of secession. The Cabinet was deeply divided. 13 At one stage, the President was indeed tempted to send additional troops into the South but, for the time being at least, decided against it, almost certainly out of fear that the southerners in his cabinet would resign in protest. Instead he tried to maintain an even-handed approach. It was one which at first continued to exhibit his pro-southern sympathies, whilst refusing to recognise the legitimacy of secession. In his fourth and final Annual Message to Congress on December 3 1860, some four weeks after the election, Buchanan presented his analysis of the current situation.
14 Acknowledging the controversies that existed over both the fugitive slave issue and the question of slavery in the territories, he implied that they were attributable to northern aggression, since "time and reflection" alone on the part of the North might have "applied the remedy" to the nation's ills. Then he became still more explicit in his criticisms of the North when he affirmed that the "immediate peril arises, not so much from these causes [the territorial and fugitive slaves issues] as from the fact that the incessant and violent agitation of the slavery question throughout the North for the last quarter of a century has at length produced its malign influence on the slaves and inspired them with vague notions of freedom." As a result southerners were fearful of "servile insurrections" and "a sense of security no longer exists around the family altar." If northern agitation were to continue and these fears were to spread so that they became pervasive within the South then "disunion will become inevitable." The President then seemed to justify disunion in such circumstances on the grounds that "self-preservation is the first law of nature, and has been implanted in the heart of man by his Creator for the wisest purpose." But this point had not yet been reached and it was up to northerners to ensure that it was never reached.
The solution was simple: "how easy" the President exclaimed, "would it be for the American people to settle the slavery question forever and to restore peace and harmony to this distracted country!" "They, and they alone," he affirmed, "can do it" and all they needed to do -"and all for which the slave States have ever contended" -was "to be let alone and permitted to manage their domestic institutions in their own way." At this point the Democratic commitment to states' rights and laissez-faire became explicit. "As sovereign States," the southern states, "and they alone," the President declared, "are responsible before God and the world for the slavery existing among them." "The people of the North" were "not more responsible and have no more right to interfere than with similar institutions in Russia or in Brazil." Thus an end to the agitation of the slavery question, agitation that was in any case utterly futile, would speedily resolve the entire crisis.
In the meantime, however, Buchanan observed, southerners should refrain from any precipitate action. Those southerners who were urging secession did so on one of two grounds. Most of them argued that it was permitted by the Constitution:
having freely chosen to enter the Union, states were equally free to leave it.
Alternatively some secessionists grounded their action in the right to revolution, which, given the origins of their own nation, few Americans rejected. Buchanan set his face against secession, whichever justification were offered. In common with almost all Republicans, and many northern Democrats too, he denied that the Constitution conferred the power on any state to withdraw from the Union. And in common with an at least equally large number of northerners he denied that the sufferings of the South were anywhere near sufficient to warrant a revolutionary response.
Buchanan reminded Congress and the nation that Lincoln had been elected according to the prescribed forms of the Constitution. He added that the Presidentelect had won only a plurality, not a majority, of the votes in the electoral college, and had triumphed only as a result of a set of circumstances (by which he probably meant the split in the Democratic party) that was unlikely ever to recur. Once again that the President had demonstrated conclusively that "no state has the right to secede unless it wishes to" and that "it is the president's duty to enforce the laws, unless someone opposed him." Such sneering was widespread in the North. 16 Part of Buchanan's problem lay in the fact that, although he could not tolerate the idea of secession, neither could he see how the Union could endure on the basis of the permanent coercion of one or more of the states. Such coercion would violate, in the most alarming way, the sacred principle of states' rights: it would thus jeopardise the very liberty that the Union was intended to secure. "The fact is," the President declared, that our Union "rests upon public opinion, and can never be cemented by the blood of its citizens shed in civil war." Even Congress, he insisted, lacked this power:
"Congress possesses many means of preserving it by conciliation, but the sword was not placed in their hand to preserve it by force." Not for the first -or last -time during the secession crisis, the President was imprisoned by the past and by Democratic party ideology. Finally it stipulated that these clauses were to be incorporated as constitutional amendments and were themselves to be unamendable.
At the heart of Crittenden's package of measures was the proposal that the Missouri Compromise line at 36° 30' should be revived. This approach was eminently satisfactory to Buchanan, who, as we have seen, had supported a slave code during the recent election. Unfortunately, however, it was utterly unacceptable to most Republicans, including Lincoln, on the grounds that it would result, they feared, in a never-ending series of southern demands for territory in Latin America.
Buchanan himself played little part in the negotiations and deliberation that took place in these weeks and months. Although he favoured the calling of a convention, he insisted that the responsibility for a settlement lay with Congress rather than the executive. As time passed, however, it became increasingly apparent that a meaningful compromise would prove extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
IV
If the President remained aloof from the attempts to broker a compromise settlement in 1860-1861 he was heavily involved, until replaced by Lincoln in the White House, in all the manoeuvring and the negotiations associated with the defence of the Federal forts located in the South. As we have seen, the President had already been advised to reinforce them and, as we have also noted, he had been tempted to accept this advice.
Here indeed was a dilemma for Buchanan, indeed for all northerners at this time.
Sending reinforcements would undoubtedly be construed as a hostile and aggressive act in the South; allowing the forts to be lost by refusing to strengthen them, would undoubtedly be construed as a humiliating capitulation by large swathes of northerners. Throughout the remaining months of his presidency Buchanan, not surprisingly, found himself unable to escape from the horns of this dilemma.
By early December Buchanan had concluded that attempts to strengthen the forts would not only risk provoking the South into secession, but would simultaneously undermine the attempts that were being made, especially in Congress, to achieve a workable and enduring compromise. This forbearance, however, Buchanan probably relied more than anyone, took a diametrically opposed view.
The President explained his position in a letter to the South Carolina.
commissioners in which he explained that "his first promptings" were to command
Anderson "to return to his former position." But before this could be ordered, South
Carolina had taken Fort Moultrie (as well as Castle Pinckney, also located at Charleston). Under those circumstances, evacuation of Sumter would have meant a total surrender of the Federal forts at Charleston and this, the President announced, he
would not consent to. Buchanan now stated unequivocally that it was his duty to defend Federal property and Federal troops against any seceding state.
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What was still unclear, however, was whether Buchanan would reinforce or re-provision these Federal outposts. Sumter now became the focus of attention. By now it had acquired enormous symbolic value. South Carolinians and secessionists generally argued that it was an affront to South Carolina's sovereignty to allow a separate and seemingly hostile nation to maintain a force within her borders (or territorial waters). Northerners, on the other hand, although they recognised that Sumter was of negligible importance militarily and probably could not, in any event,
be successfully defended against a determined assault, viewed the fort as no less than a symbol of American nationhood. It represented the Union itself. Initially his pro-southern orientation betrayed his utter lack of understanding of the slavery question. His failure was here almost total. Slavery raised the most profound questions about government and society, morality and economy, not merely in the South but throughout the United States. Yet Buchanan could see no cause for conflict or even real controversy. Here, however, he was merely echoing the views of the great majority of those in his party in the northern states. What they all failed to understand was that slavery and the enormous material interest that supported it had had a profound impact upon the way they viewed the world. That material interest and the ideology upon which it was inscribed, had served to blind them to dangers that other northerners were acutely aware of. It was partly for this reason that Democrats, from Buchanan and Douglas downwards, were unable to chart a course through, or even decisively influence events during, the secession crisis.
In a different way Buchanan can be criticised for his management of the crisis.
For most of the four months between Lincoln's election and his inauguration he was essentially passive. At the centre of his strategy lay the belief that time was on his and the Union's side. As long as he did nothing to precipitate armed conflict, there would be time for the forces of compromise to stage a triumphant rally. This too betrayed a lack of understanding.
Buchanan's passivity was replaced by a genuine activism only once. When he ordered the Star of the West to Charleston, the President was seeking to shape rather than merely react to events. But, as we have seen, no sooner had he taken this decision than he sought to revoke it. Moreover, when the Star was fired upon, Buchanan had no policy to offer and immediately lost the unwonted popularity he had briefly enjoyed in the North.
It is one thing, however, to find fault with Buchanan's conduct in these weeks and months and quite another to identify a leader who did appreciably better. Many historians have compared Buchanan with Lincoln and almost all of them have come down strongly in favour of the President-elect. This is an understandable conclusion.
When Lincoln sent provisions to Anderson he, unlike Buchanan was careful first to inform Anderson, second to inform the South Carolinians and third to ensure that only provisions, rather than military reinforcements, were sent. These differences were significant. They made it much easier for Lincoln to claim that southerners were the aggressors than it would have been for Buchanan three months earlier. claimed, the majorities for secession were extremely small so that, futile and botched though the initiative was, it may well have inclined a critical number of otherwise loyal southerners towards disunion. 23 This interpretation, however, almost certainly misconstrues the thinking of those whom it classifies as unionist in sentiment and thus overestimates the impact of Buchanan's action. In fact there was little true unionism in the Deep South. A high proportion of those who were opposed to immediate secession favored an ultimatum to the North. Either Lincoln would retreat from the platform on which he had been elected, and specifically from his opposition to the future creation of new slave states, or secession would take place. These southerners in turn misconstrued Republican sentiment. Having come into existence as a party with the express purpose of checking the aggressions of the "Slave Power," Republicans were now being asked, at the very moment of triumph, to make the most humiliating surrender of their principles to that very power. A few conservatives within the party were willing to contemplate this retreat but it was rejected even by a moderate like Lincoln. As a result many of the so-called unionists in the South were in reality secessionists, whether they knew it or not, since they advocated an ultimatum to the Republicans that was certain to be rejected. Thus the scope for Buchanan to influence opinion decisively was extremely limited. Most southerners, when they discussed the President at all, usually recognised that he was a lame duck whose power was ebbing.
Almost everyone recognised that the key decisions and actions would be taken by his successor in the White House.
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The final verdict on Buchanan must depend on the criteria used. If he is judged by absolute standards, his failure to appreciate the contentiousness of the slavery question must weigh heavily against him. But it is a sad fact that others, like
Lincoln and indeed the southerners who embarked upon secession (thinking either that would be no war or that it would result in a swift and overwhelming Confederate triumph) were guilty of equally significant errors and misperceptions. This is not to say, however, that Buchanan was part of a "blundering generation" who can be blamed for failing to avert a "needless war." Although there were blunders or at least errors and misperceptions, the vital ones were not the product of individual shortcomings. As we have seen, many of Buchanan's mistakes and misunderstandings were typical of northern Democrats generally. Like the other mistakes and misunderstandings made at the time by both Republicans and secessionists, they deeply rooted in a specific ideology or world-views. And those
